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1 Introduction
A necessary condition for cost-effective regulation is that marginal compliance costs are equal
across all regulated sources. Environmental regulations that achieve this condition include
pollution taxes and cap-and-trade programs. Despite the increasing prevalence of market-
based environmental policies, many environmental regulations still deviate from this central
economic principle. Inefficiencies can arise for two reasons. First, policies may inefficiently
allocate pollution abatement across sectors or firms. Second, policies may limit intertemporal
arbitrage of abatement costs, requiring firms to meet the same standard in every compliance
period.
The gains from moving to more efficient regulation are usually unknown. Estimating
efficiency gains requires knowledge of firms’ marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves, which
are difficult to recover. Those studies that do estimate MAC curves find that gains from
trade can be substantial. Carlson et al. (2000) study the SO2 emissions trading program
under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and find that annual compliance
costs were $800 million (43%) lower with trading compared to a uniform standard. Fowlie
et al. (2012) document substantial differences in NOx abatement costs across the electricity
and transportation sectors and estimate that equating MACs across the two sectors could
reduce total compliance costs by $1.6 billion (6%).
In this paper, we study the impacts and efficiency of a new natural gas flaring regula-
tion in North Dakota. North Dakota’s Bakken shale formation is valued primarily for its
vast unconventional oil deposits. However, when firms extract oil, their wells also produce
valuable natural gas and natural gas liquid (NGL) co-products. In the absence of pipeline
infrastructure, these co-products are flared: burned at the well site (Swanson, 2014). Flaring
has become an acute problem in unconventional oil fields in the US because of the explosion
in production over the past decade. Despite the rapid growth in production, infrastructure
to capture and process the associated natural gas has lagged behind. In July 2014, the North
Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC) passed Commission Order 24665 to reduce gas flaring
in the state. The regulation established some of the most aggressive flaring standards in the
US, and other regulatory agencies have closely followed its progress (Storrow, 2015).
Order 24665 mandates that every operator in North Dakota captures a minimum per-
centage of gas produced by all their wells, with an ultimate objective of capturing 91% of
produced gas by 2020. Several features of the regulation indicate it is inefficient. First, it is
firm-specific. Since 2015, every firm operating in North Dakota must meet the same flaring
standard. If operators have different marginal costs of capturing gas, the policy inefficiently
allocates abatement across firms. Second, firms must meet the flaring standard every month.
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If abatement costs change over time due to expanding pipeline infrastructure or firms drilling
new wells, firms may misallocate abatement intertemporally. Gas capture regulations have
been identified as among the most difficult and costly regulations for oil-producing firms to
comply with (Zirogiannis et al., 2016), suggesting the costs of abatement misallocation may
be large.
We begin by characterizing the impact of the NDIC regulation on firms’ well operations.
We find that the regulation decreased flaring rates at new wells by 4–7 percentage points
in the first year of production and that the regulation accounted for between one-third and
one-half of the observed year-on-year reduction in flaring rates at new wells in the state.
Firms complied with the regulation by accelerating how quickly they connect their wells to
gas capture infrastructure, and by taking longer to complete (i.e., begin producing from) new
wells after drilling. Consistent with previous literature, we do not find that firms responded
to the regulation by curtailing oil or gas production (Kellogg, 2011; Anderson et al., 2016).
We next construct firm MAC curves. The exercise is motivated by our empirical finding
that firms’ comply with the regulation by connecting wells to pipeline infrastructure. We
use detailed pipeline location data to measure the distance between wells and the nearest
pipeline infrastructure. We then use engineering estimates to construct estimates of on-
site and pipeline infrastructure costs for each well and then aggregate the cost estimates
to construct firm-specific and industry MAC curves. We use the estimated cost curves to
simulate three counterfactual scenarios that achieve the same aggregate flaring reductions
that we observe from January 2015 to June 2016, the first eighteen months of the policy.
We document significant heterogeneity in abatement costs, both across firms and over time.
Using our preferred cost estimates, reallocating abatement reduces aggregate compliance
costs by $96 million, or 20%, over the first eighteen months of the regulation. About two-
thirds of the reductions result from equating marginal abatement costs across firms, and
one-third comes from equating marginal abatement costs within a firm over time. We also
calculate counterfactual taxes that could achieve the same observed flaring reductions. We
find that the state could achieve the same flaring reductions by taxing flared gases at a
rate of $0.42/mcf. To put the value in perspective, the average public lands royalty rate on
gas revenues over this period was around $0.45/mcf. Alternatively, this amounts to taxing
carbon emissions from flared gas at $7.92/tCO2, well below current social cost of carbon
estimates.
Regulators have several incentives to limit flaring. First, flaring is associated with a
number of environmental externalities. Worldwide, flaring results in 300 million tons of
CO2 emissions each year, equivalent to the emissions of 50 million cars (World Bank, 2015).
Flaring also emits local pollutants including NOx, SO2, and aromatic hydrocarbons that
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have been linked to cardiovascular disease and increased prevalence of cancer. Second, flaring
results in economic losses to lease-owners and the government since flared gases are rarely
subject to royalty payments and taxes. In the US, federal and state agencies have passed
or considered a number of regulations to reduce gas flaring. For example, the Bureau of
Land Management and the EPA recently considered rules to regulate flaring and methane
emissions (Bureau of Land Management, 2016), while the Fish and Wildlife Service has
considered regulating hydraulically fractured wells drilled on and near protected habitats.
Globally, the World Bank has a Zero Routine Flaring initiative seeking to eliminate routine
flaring by 2030.
Our work contributes to a growing literature studying the economic impacts of the fracking
revolution. Previous work has documented the health and pollution impacts of fracking
(Olmstead et al., 2013; Hill, 2015); how nearby drilling is capitalized into housing values
(Gopalakrishnan and Klaiber, 2014; Muehlenbachs et al., 2015; Bartik et al., 2017); the
efficiency of landowner-firm leases (Vissing, 2016); the supply elasticity of fracked versus
conventional wells (Newell et al., 2016); and the economic and welfare impacts of these newly
reachable resources (Hausman and Kellogg, 2015; Feyrer et al., 2017). Only recently have
others begun to analyze firm decision-making, specifically learning, in this setting (Covert,
2015). To date, little work has studied the effects of environmental regulations on oil and gas
firms’ decision-making. One contribution of our paper is to take advantage of a rich dataset
to develop novel identification strategies to study the impact of policies on well operations.
This paper contributes more generally to an extensive literature studying efficient regula-
tion. Environmental economists have long advocated for moving from command-and-control
to market-based policies. The theoretical efficiency of market-based instruments is well es-
tablished (Montgomery, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1988) but little work has been able to
empirically validate these results (Carlson et al., 2000; Kerr and Newell, 2003; Fowlie et al.,
2012).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe oil production in the Bakken, the
institutional and regulatory setting in the state, and the North Dakota flaring regulation.
In Section 3, we develop a model of a firm’s production and gas connection decisions to
clarify the margins through which firms may respond to the regulation and motivate our
subsequent simulations. In Section 4 we describe our data and provide summary statistics,
and in Section 5 we discuss our empirical strategy and present our results of the effects of the
regulation on firms’ flaring and production decisions. In Section 6 we estimate firm-specific
marginal abatement cost curves and construct counterfactual flaring scenarios. Section 7
concludes. The appendix contains more details on how we perform the counterfactuals, as
well as a set of sensitivity and robustness checks.
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2 Background
2.1 The Bakken Shale Formation
Much of North Dakota’s geology is characterized by “tight” formations where oil is locked into
the structure of shale rock. Two advances have drastically improved the economic viability
of extracting oil in the region. First, drilling operations have become more efficient at drilling
horizontal wells. Since shale formations are found in horizontal layers in the earth, drilling
horizontally exposes the well to more oil-rich rock than vertically drilled wells. Second, firms
have become more efficient at fracturing shale rock. Fracturing involves injecting fluids into
wells at extremely high pressures to fracture the surrounding rock so that oil can flow out
of the well.
These innovations have transformed the oil and gas industry. Oil production from fracked
wells now accounts for nearly half of US production (Energy Information Administration,
2015), and oil production in North Dakota has increased tenfold from 90,000 barrels per day
(bpd) in 2005 to over 1.2 million bpd in 2015 (North Dakota Industrial Commission, 2016).
Firms have also dramatically reduced their costs of extraction – break-even oil prices in the
state have been recently estimated to be as low as $35 per barrel (bbl) (Bailey, 2015). North
Dakota is likely to continue producing substantial quantities of oil into the future. The US
Geological Survey estimates that the Bakken and Three Forks shale formations contain 7.4
billion bbls of oil, accounting for nearly 20% of proven recoverable reserves in the United
States (Gaswirth et al., 2013; Energy Information Administration, 2016a).1
In addition to oil, the Bakken formation contains 6.7 trillion cubic feet of associated
natural gas and 530 million barrels of NGLs (Gaswirth et al., 2013). When oil is produced
by a fracked well, these gas co-products come along with it. Historically, much of this gas
has been flared. This comes at a significant cost to landowners and the state government
because flared gas is rarely subject to royalty and tax payments. The lost value of the gas
is non-negligible. Flared gas constituted about 14% of the energy content of the produced
crude oil from 2006 to 2013 (Brandt et al., 2016), and the commercial value of NGLs flared
by North Dakota well operators in May 2013 alone was estimated to be $3.6 million (Salmon
and Logan, 2013).2
1Three Forks is a smaller formation adjacent to the Bakken. We address both of them as the Bakken.
2Flaring is much preferred to venting, or releasing gases directly into the atmosphere. Vented gases
contain compounds like hydrogen sulfide that are hazardous to human health. Flaring converts methane and
other pollutants to CO2 and reduces the quantity of other harmful by-products. Venting is also prohibited
in North Dakota.
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2.2 The North Dakota Flaring Regulation and Firm Compliance
The NDIC passed Order 24665 in 2014 to reduce flaring in the state (North Dakota Industrial
Commission, 2015).3,4 Order 24665 created ambitious gas capture goals. The regulation
requires that every firm operating in the Bakken capture 77% of the gas produced at their
wells from January 2015 to March 2016; 80% from April 2016 through October 2018; 85%
from November 2016 through October 2018; 88% from November 2018 through October
2020; and 91% after November 2020. The gas capture requirements are applied uniformly
across firms and firms must comply with the regulation every month.5 Thus, the policy is
akin to a within-firm cap-and-trade program, where firms can efficiently allocate abatement
among all the wells they own, but cannot trade flaring rights with other firms. The regulation
allows firms to bank excess gas captured for up to three months, but does it not allow for
borrowing. The NDIC has indicated that to date, few firms have taken advantage of the
banking provisions. Firms that violate the regulation can have wells ordered to curtail
production to as low as 100 bpd.6 If a firm is out of compliance for more than three months,
it may incur civil penalties of up to $12,500 per day for each well that is below the firm-level
capture target.
Firms must comply with the NDIC regulation every month. Each month, the NDIC
calculates each firm’s capture rate as7
(% Capture)i =
∑
j
(
gsi,j + g
u
i,j + g
p
i,j
)∑
j g
i
j
where j indexes the wells owned by firm i; gsi,j is gas sales from well j; g
u
i,j is gas used
on site; gpi,j is the gas processed in an approved manner; and g
i
j is total gas produced by
well j.8 Firms’ primary compliance mechanism is to connect wells to existing gas pipeline
infrastructure. This involves installing smaller pipelines, called gathering lines, that connect
3A task force was first organized to develop a plan to reduce flaring in North Dakota in September 2013.
In March 2014 the task force released its report and the ruling was subsequently adopted.
4Before its passage, the only existing flaring regulation was a requirement that operators pay taxes and
royalties on flared gas after the first year of production (Energy Information Administration, 2016b). This
was not particularly burdensome since wells produce most of their total oil and gas in the first year.
5The NDIC was cognizant of cost-effectiveness. Order 24665 explicitly states that it is firm-specific
instead of well-specific to give firms “maximum flexibility” in complying with the policy (North Dakota
Industrial Commission, 2015).
6Average production at new wells from 2015 to 2016 was 633 bpd in the first three months of production
and 378 bpd in the first year of production. A substantial portion of industry stakeholders commented
during the regulation’s hearing on how the curtailments would negatively affect well economics, firm cash
flow, and profitability.
7Firm compliance is determined with some delay due to reporting lags from industry. For example, the
NDIC did not discuss aggregate flaring rates for January 2015 until its March 2015 monthly webinar.
8Gas may be used on site to power an electric generator or processed using a natural gas stripping unit.
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the well site to larger product pipelines that transport the captured gas to processing plants.
Connecting a well to gas capture infrastructure does not eliminate flaring. Flaring at
connected wells may still occur due to insufficient capacity of downstream gathering pipelines,
product pipelines, or gas processing facilities. Firms have some margins to reduce flaring by
changing practices on the well site. For example, a firm can temporarily curtail oil and gas
production or use gas for other purposes on site. Alternatively, firms can build “looping”
lines to circulate and store gas in case of insufficient downstream capacity.
The NDIC began enforcing the regulation in January 2015, and all active wells in the
state were included in firms’ gas capture calculations at that time. However, a well is not
subject to the regulation for the well’s first 90 production days. As a result, firms have
substantial flexibility with regards to their flaring rates at new wells until the fourth month
of production.
2.3 Oil Production in the Bakken
Understanding the impacts of Order 24665 on firm behavior requires knowledge of firms’
decision-making and oil and gas production functions. After firms determine a suitable
location and obtain the mineral rights, firms drill or “spud” a well. Most producers hire
independent drilling companies for this. Drilling is completed in multiple stages, including:
(i) drilling the vertical segment of the well; (ii) drilling one or more “laterals” or horizontal
segments through the oil-rich shale layer; and (iii) inserting and securing production casing
to protect surface water and ensure the structural integrity of the well. After drilling, firms
hydraulically fracture the well. Fracking involves perforating the well casing and injecting
large amounts of water, sand, and other additives at high pressure to create and prop open
fissures in the surrounding shale rock. A well is “completed” and ready to produce oil and
natural gas after it has been fractured. At this stage, firms install a permanent wellhead
and other on-site infrastructure. Oil, gas, and water flow from the wellhead through the
flow lines to tanks that separate oil from water and lighter hydrocarbon products. After
separation, oil is stored in large containers until it is picked up to be delivered to the nearest
pipeline or refinery. If the well is connected to gas gathering infrastructure, the separated
gas is transported to nearby gas plants through pipelines. If the well does not have gathering
lines installed, separated gas is flared at the well site.
The amount of oil and gas that a well produces is determined by two factors: (i) the
amount of hydrocarbons in the underlying shale; and (ii) the length of the well and the
intensity with which firms frack the well. Firms can affect the former by drilling in more
productive areas. However, firms are not perfectly informed, and they do not always drill
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into the most productive shale (Covert, 2015). After a well is producing, the amount of oil
and gas that comes out of the well is largely determined by the underlying pressure. While
operators can curtail production or plug a well, they are unable to make the well more
productive unless they re-fracture it.9
3 A Model of Gas Capture
We develop a model of an oil and gas producer to better understand the economic incentives
of the NDIC’s regulation and to identify factors that contribute to the inefficiency of the
policy. We model a single firm facing the flaring regulation in a two-stage, static setting. In
the first stage, the firm selects the number of wells to drill, J , the location of these wells,
the length of the horizontal segment of the well, and how much of each input (e.g., water
and sand) to use when fracking the wells. Between the first and second stages, the wells are
fracked and completed. At the beginning of the second stage, the oil and gas productivity
of each well is realized, and the firm decides whether to connect each well to gas capture
infrastructure. At the end of the second stage, oil is sold at price P o and, if the well is
connected to gas capture infrastructure, gas is sold at price P g. Here we will focus on the
second stage.
We make two additional assumptions. First, the firm’s connection decision is independent
of its oil production (i.e., connecting a well has a negligible effect on oil-related profits).
This assumption allows us to abstract from wells’ oil production when considering the firm’s
gas connection decision. Second, we assume that the firm knows the total amount of gas
a well will produce when it makes the connection decision. Neither assumption is overly
restrictive in our setting. We are unaware of literature documenting production losses from
installing gas capture infrastructure. After completion, oil and gas production follows a
relatively stable, well-understood decline curve. A common characterization is the ‘ARPS’
model (Fetkovich, 1980). The model specifies well j’s oil and gas production in any period
t as
ojt = Oj0t
βo exp(jt)
gjt = Gj0t
βg exp(ejt) (1)
9Kellogg (2011) and Anderson et al. (2016) study conventional oil wells in Texas and argue that oil
prices impact well drilling rather than production from existing wells. They show that along an equilibrium
path, firms always keep wells producing at their maximum possible level regardless of the prevailing oil price.
This result has one caveat in unconventional oil setting: firms may re-pressurize unconventional wells by
re-fracking.
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where ojt and gjt are the well’s oil and gas production at time t; Oj0 and Gj0 are the initial
levels of oil and gas production from the well; βo and βg are the oil and gas decline rates;
and jt and ejt are noise terms. In the first stage, the firm’s input choices and the underlying
geology determine Oj0 and Gj0. So long as jt and ejt are small and mean zero, firms can
estimate the total oil and gas that a well will produce with a fair degree of confidence after
observing a well’s initial production and decline rates at similar wells.10
Consider the second stage of the firm’s problem. Wells are heterogeneous in the amount
of gas they produce and their connection costs. Well j produces gj units of gas over its
lifetime, which can be calculated by summing equation (1) over the lifetime of the well. We
denote the connection costs for well j as Cj(hj), where hj ∈ {0, 1} and 1 indicates that the
well is connected to a gathering line while 0 indicates that it is left unconnected. We assume
that Cj(0) = 0, Cj(1) > 0.
11 We model the NDIC flaring restriction as a minimum fraction
of gas that must be captured by the firm across all its wells, F¯ ∈ (α, 1] where α > 0 is
sufficiently high so that the flaring constraint binds.
The firm’s problem is
max
h1,...,hJ
J∑
j=1
P g gj hj − Cj(hj)
subject to:
∑J
j=1 gj hj∑J
j=1 gj
≥ F¯ and hj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j = 1, ..., J
Let λ denote the Lagrange multiplier on the flaring constraint. The firm connects well j if
P g + λ ≥ Cj(1)
gj
, j = 1, ..., J. (2)
The firm connects well j if the marginal benefit of selling gas, the market price plus the
firm’s shadow price of the constraint, is greater than the cost of connecting the well per unit
of gas produced.
The first-order condition yields key insights that allow us to empirically evaluate the
efficiency of the regulation. A cost-effective policy equalizes shadow prices across all firms,
and in a dynamic model, a cost-effective policy equalizes a firm’s shadow price over all
compliance periods. If F¯ is applied uniformly across different firms, then λ will differ across
firms if they own portfolios of wells with heterogeneous connection costs or gas productivity.
10While unconventional drilling remains a relatively new technique, there is evidence that unconventional
wells have less variability in realized production than conventional wells (Newell et al., 2016).
11Gathering line costs vary along two important dimensions: (i) distance to the nearest product pipeline;
and (ii) the diameter of the line.
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Letting m denote the marginal well that a firm connects to gas capture infrastructure,
differences in Cm(1)/gm across firms indicates differences in λ across firms and that the
flaring regulation inefficiently allocated gas capture. Alternatively we can think of different
firms in this static model as the same firm but at different points in time, assuming the firm
is not forward-looking. A cost-effective policy would require that the per unit connection
cost of the marginal well be equal in all compliance periods. We take advantage of these
insights in Section 6.1 when we construct firm marginal abatement costs curves.
4 Data Description and Summary Graphs
Our data consist of monthly, well-level production, flaring, and sales data reported by the
NDIC for over 9,300 horizontal wells owned and operated by 54 firms in North Dakota
between 2007 and 2016. For most of our analysis, we focus on the roughly 6,800 wells
completed between January 2012 and June 2016. We process the data from the NDIC in a
few ways. First, we focus on oil and gas wells in the Bakken or Three Forks shale formation
since the NDIC regulation applies only to these wells. Second, we drop wells where we observe
the maximum level of oil production occurring more than five months after we observe their
first production. These wells have likely been re-fracked and are not comparable to other
wells.12
We observe a number of well-level characteristics including the year and month of spud-
ding and completion; wells’ latitude/longitude; well depth and horizontal length; and the
current and original owner of all wells.13 We merge the data with well characteristics from
a number of other sources. First, we obtained GIS data for all natural gas and oil pipelines
in 2016 from Rextag. We use the data to calculate the distance between every well and the
nearest gas gathering or transmission pipeline.14 Second, we merge data on the volume of the
wells’ fracking inputs from the FracFocus Chemical Disclosure Registry. We obtain weather
data from the nearest weather monitoring station provided by the North Dakota Agricul-
tural Weather Network, and snowfall data from the NOAA National Operational Hydrologic
Remote Sensing Center. Last, we control for historical oil and gas price data using futures
prices for Henry Hub (HH) natural gas and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil prices from
12We drop just over 1,000 wells as a result of these restrictions.
13Only the most recent operator and initial operator are provided. We do not observe the sales date of
any wells and thus cannot determine when any well purchases may have occured.
14A disadvantage of the Rextag data is that we only observe a cross-section of North Dakota’s pipeline
network. We do not observe when each pipeline became active. We have also explored distance to the
nearest well connected to gas capture infrastructure as an alternative distance measure that is time-variant
to proxy for the roll-out of the gas pipeline network. Using this alternative measure does not affect our
primary results.
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Figure 1: Oil and gas production, gas flaring, and well completions in the Bakken.
(a) Aggregate Oil & Gas Production and
Flaring (b) Completed and Connected Wells
Notes: Figure 1a graphs total production and flaring from all horizontal wells in our sample from January
2007 to June 2016. Figure 1b graphs the cumulative number of completed and connected wells (left axis),
and the number of unconnected wells (right axis) over the same period.
Quandl.15,16
Figures 1a and 1b graph monthly oil and gas production, gas flaring, the number of
completed and connected wells, and the number of unconnected wells from January 2007
to June 2016 for all wells in our sample. Oil and gas production grew exponentially until
mid-2014 when oil prices began to fall, and operators flared a substantial volume of the
gas produced in the state over this period. It was not uncommon to observe months where
flaring rates exceeded 40% from 2008 to 2009, and monthly flaring rates regularly exceeded
30% until early 2014. Both the volume and rate of gas flaring has decreased since around
the beginning of 2015 when the flaring regulation kicked in. Figure 1b highlights one of the
main mechanisms through which firms have reduced flaring – the number of unconnected
wells in the state has declined rapidly, particularly around January 2015.
Figures 2a to 2d graph average oil production, gas production, flaring rates, and the
fraction of wells connected to gas capture infrastructure in well ‘production time.’ Production
15Oil and gas prices for North Dakota crude oil are not publicly available at the frequency we require
over the full sample period. In a monthly online webinar, the director of the NDIC stated that while there
is no traded Bakken oil price, it is typically paid as a basis off of the WTI and that a reasonable estimate
of the price received by Bakken producers is 85% of the WTI price. We are unaware of posted prices for
natural gas in the state. However, recent work by Avalos et al. (2016) suggests that natural gas prices are
integrated even in distant markets across the US.
16In our main specifications, we control for the average of all concurrently traded futures prices up to
twelve months ahead. Results are not sensitive to using spot prices, the 6 month ahead futures price, or the
12 month ahead futures price.
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Figure 2: Well production, flaring and connection rates by production month.
(a) Average Oil Production (b) Average Gas Production
(c) Average Flaring Rate (d) Average Connection Rate
Notes: The subfigures graph average oil and gas production, flaring rates, and connection rates in
production time at wells completed in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015/16. The dotted lines in subfigure (c)
indicate the January 2015 flaring target and the fourth month in production time.
time is defined as the months since the first month of observed oil production from a well.
The figures document the substantial gains in productivity over time. Initial oil and gas
production averaged 600 bpd and 600 thousand cubic feet per day (mcf/day) in 2012. By
2015–2016, initial oil production increased by 25% to 750 bpd and gas production increased
by 50% to nearly 900 mcf/day. The figures also illustrate the approximately exponential
decline rate in oil and gas production over the first year of production.
Flaring rates decline slowly over wells’ productive lifetimes. In 2012 and 2013, firms flared
around 40% of the gas that wells produced in their fourth production month, and flaring
rates remained above 20% even after a full year of production. Wells completed in 2014 and
2015-2016 display nearly identical flaring rates in the first two production months. However,
beginning in month three, wells completed in 2015–2016 show a rapid decline in flaring
relative to 2014 until around the eighth production month. In the fourth month, when
wells are subject to the flaring regulation, average flaring at wells completed in 2015–2016
11
is about 23% – the flaring limit set by the NDIC for 2015. Figure 2d graphs the fraction of
wells that connected in a given production month. In 2012 and 2013, just around 40% of
wells connected to gas infrastructure in their first production month, but by 2014–2016 this
increased to about 60%.17
5 Effects of the NDIC Flaring Order
In this section, we describe our empirical strategy to estimate the impact of the NDIC
regulation on flaring rates at new wells in North Dakota. We then describe our methods to
disentangle the mechanisms by which firms respond to the regulation. We focus on: (i) time
to complete wells; (ii) time to connect wells to gas capture infrastructure; and (iii) oil and
gas production.18 Last, we present our results.
5.1 Empirical Strategy: Flaring
We begin with a reduced form description of the regulation’s effects. Our main empirical
strategies use difference and difference-in-differences estimation frameworks. Because the
majority of gas production, and therefore flaring, occurs in the first few months after firms
complete a well, we limit our analysis to the impact of the regulation on wells completed
after January 2015 and focus on wells’ first year of production.
We define our treatment group as North Dakota wells that were completed and began
production in 2015–2016. Ideally we would observe wells drilled in similar locations over
the same period that happened to be exempt from the regulation. While there are some
unconventional oil wells in nearby Montana and Saskatchewan, the number of wells outside
North Dakota is small, and data are not available at the same spatial or temporal resolution.
We instead take advantage of the fact that wells drilled in North Dakota before the regulation
have very similar production patterns over their lifetimes. In our main specifications, we
define our control wells as those that were completed in 2014 and define time in our estimation
as production time.19 We include a number of covariates and fixed effects to control for
important factors that may differentially affect flaring at wells completed after 2015 versus
17Table A.1 in the appendix presents other relevant summary statistics, comparing wells completed in
2012–2014 to those completed after 2015.
18We do not consider other margins such as well location, well length, or fracking input choice. Con-
versations with regulators and operators in North Dakota suggest that drilling and location decisions are
primarily determined by oil prices.
19Wells completed in 2014 are eventually subject to the regulation. For example, flaring from a well
completed in July 2014 is included in the firm’s flaring calculations beginning in January 2015. Thus, we
drop control well observations after the 2015 calendar year. In the appendix we perform a suite of sensitivity
and robustness checks.
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those completed in 2014.
Our first empirical strategy is a differences strategy that compares flaring rates at wells
completed in 2014 versus those completed after 2015 over their first year of production. We
estimate the following regression:
Yiftτ = ρ1[Completed 2015] + g(t; Θ) + X
′
ifτβ + εiftτ , (3)
where Yiftτ is the flaring rate at well i owned by firm f in production month t and calendar
month τ .20 Xifτ includes the log of the well’s gas production; the log of changes in HH
and WTI prices; the log distance to nearest pipeline; and local weather conditions.21 The
function g(t; θ) is a flexible function in production time that controls for common practices
across wells in each production month. In our main specification, we specify g(t; Θ) as
production time fixed effects. Last, in Xifτ we include township fixed effects to control
for fixed characteristics of the well’s location, firm fixed effects to control for fixed owner
characteristics, and month fixed effects to control for seasonality in production, drilling, and
prices.22
Our second empirical strategy leverages the fact that wells are not included in firms’
aggregate flaring calculations until their fourth production month. For this, we estimate the
following difference-in-differences regression:
Yiftτ = ρ1[Completed 2015, t ≥ 4] + g(t; Θ) + X′ifτβ + εiftτ . (4)
The controls are the same as the prior specification, with the exception that well fixed effects
are now in Xifτ and absorb the township fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and distance to a
pipeline.
Our last empirical strategy is a matching estimator that compares flaring at wells com-
pleted in 2015 versus those completed in 2014. We use nearest-neighbor matching for every
well completed after 2015 to its five closest matches from wells completed in 2014. We match
wells based on their initial gas production, well depth, distance to a pipeline, average log
difference in WTI and HH prices, and the number of months that we observe the well.23 The
20For example, Yif,1,τ is the percent of the produced gas that is flared at well i in its first month of
production, and Yif,12,τ is the percent of produced gas flared in the twelfth month of production.
21We cannot reject the null hypothesis that log WTI and Henry Hub prices contain a unit root over
our sample and the two series are highly collinear in levels. We, therefore, first difference the series in all
regressions, controlling for whether the average twelve month ahead futures strip of each variable is increasing
or decreasing in any given month. Weather controls include total precipitation and temperature.
22A township is a 6-by-6 mile square defined by the US Geological Survey.
23We use a Mahalanobis scaling matrix to determine our matched sample. We match wells exactly on
the number of production months. Following Abadie and Imbens (2011), we adjust the estimates for bias
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simplest representation of our estimated treatment effect is given by:
ρˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[
Yˆi(1)− Yˆi(0)
]
, (5)
where Yˆi(1) and Yˆi(0) are the appropriately adjusted average flaring rates at wells that are
subject to the regulation and not subject to the regulation.
Our identifying assumption is that, absent the NDIC regulation and conditional on our
full set of controls, flaring rates for wells completed in 2015 would have the same level over
the first year of the production as at wells completed in 2014 for the differences and matching
strategies, and that flaring rates for wells completed in 2015 would follow parallel trends to
wells completed in 2014. All strategies defined above identify changes in average flaring rates
over either the entire first year of well production or the over fourth to twelfth production
months. We explore heterogeneity in the regulation’s effect throughout a well’s lifetime by
estimating difference-in-differences regressions of the form:
Yiftτ =
12∑
s=1
ρs1[Treated, t=s] + g(t; Θ) + X
′
ifτβ + αi + εift. (6)
Equation (6) allows for separate coefficients ρs for each of the first twelve production months.
5.2 Empirical Strategy: Mechanisms
We use similar empirical strategies to disentangle how firms comply with the regulation. We
consider three margins of behavior. First, we test whether firms take longer to complete wells
after spudding (drilling). This may indicate that firms install more on-site infrastructure,
including gas capture infrastructure. Second, we test whether firms connect to gas capture
infrastructure more quickly. Because gas output is highest in the first production months,
reducing time to connection can increase the total amount of gas captured. Last, we test
whether firms curtail oil and gas production at wells subject to the regulation.
Spud-to-completion and first production-to-connection duration: We estimate
survival (hazard) models for the spud-to-completion time and first production-to-connection
time. In the former, wells “survive” if they are not completed (i.e., not producing) t months
after spudding, and “die” if they are completed. In the latter, firms “survive” if they remain
unconnected to gas capture infrastructure t months after initial production and “die” if they
resulting from matching on more than one continuous covariate.
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connect. We define control and treatment groups as before, consider only the first twelve
production months, and throw out data for wells completed in 2014 after January 2015.
We first estimate a non-parametric Kaplan-Meier (KM) survivor function for each out-
come. Let t¯j denote the production month a well is completed or connected to gas capture
infrastructure, ij denote the number of wells not completed or connected before production
month t¯j, and cj be the number of wells that are completed or connected in production
month t¯j. The KM function is given by:
Sˆ(t) =
∏
j|t¯j≤t
(
ij − cj
ij
)
. (7)
We estimate equation (7) separately for wells completed in 2014 and those completed after
2015.
Equation (7) does not control for differences in the economic environment, gas capture
infrastructure, or weather between the treatment and control groups. We therefore also
estimate a parametric survival model with time-varying controls. Specifically, we estimate a
hazard function for wells that are either completed or connected in period t as:
h(t, 1[Treated],Xit; Θ) =
f(t, 1[Treated],Xit; Θ)
1− F (t, 1[Treated],Xit; Θ) , (8)
where f(·) and F (·) are Weibull density and cumulative density functions of the spud-
to-completion time or first production-to-connection time.24 For our spud-to-completion
regressions, the covariates Xit include fracking inputs, well depth, oil and gas prices, and
distance to nearest pipeline. For time to connection regressions, we control for initial gas
production, distance to pipeline, and oil and gas prices. Our coefficient of interest in both
cases is on the indicator function for whether the well was completed after 2015.
To facilitate interpretation we also estimate regression-adjusted average treatment effects
(ATE) of the regulation on the spud-to-completion time and first production-to-connection
time. We first estimate separate Weibull survival models for wells completed in 2014 and
those completed after 2015. To ensure we have one predicted survival time for each well, we
estimate a time-invariant version of equation (8). We then predict and compare the average
survival times for each group to estimate an ATE of the regulation on time to completion
24Results are similar using an exponential and Gompertz survival distribution. Newell et al. (2016) use a
generalized gamma distribution to estimate spud-to-completion times for conventional and unconventional
oil wells in Texas. Results using a generalized gamma model are also similar to our Weibull results when we
do not include covariates. However, including controls in the model leads to convergence issues.
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and connection.25
Oil and gas production: Last, we test whether the regulation affects wells’ oil and gas
production. We estimate regression equations (3) and (4), where we replace Yiftτ with the
logarithm of oil or gas production. In these regressions, the function g(t; Θ) controls for the
average oil and gas decline curve. Similar to Newell et al. (2016), we use three forms of g(·):
(i) an ARPS model where g(·) is the logarithm of production time; (ii) a cubic spline in
production time;26 and (iii) production time fixed effects. Controls include oil or gas prices,
initial oil or gas production, local weather conditions, and township fixed effects. As above,
we also use a matching estimator comparing wells’ oil and gas production for wells completed
in 2014 versus those completed after 2015.
5.3 Results: Flaring Treatment Effects
Table 1 presents our estimates of the effect of the regulation on flaring. Columns (1) to
(3) show estimates of the treatment effects over the first year of production, and columns
(4) to (6) show estimates of the treatment effects over the fourth to twelfth production
months. Panel A includes all wells, and Panel B includes only wells that were connected by
their second production month. The latter is meant to test whether the regulation impacts
routine flaring that occurs after a well is connected to gas gathering infrastructure.
After controlling for observable differences between wells completed in 2014 versus those
completed after 2015, we find that all wells flared 4%–7% less over the first production
year. The results differ between the difference-in-differences estimates and the matching
estimators for months four to twelve. The former finds no impact while the latter finds
substantive decreases. Panel B presents results for connected wells. We find no systematic
reduction in flaring across these wells, suggesting that the regulation has little discernible
impact on routine flaring. The point estimates for other covariates have intuitive signs.
Firms flare more at wells if they produce more gas and if they are further from pipeline
infrastructure, and firms flare less when natural gas prices are improving.
Figure 3 graphs the estimates and 95% confidence intervals from equation (6). The regres-
sion includes the same controls as in column (5) of Table 1, and we present estimates for all
wells and those that were connected in their first two production months. All estimates are
relative to the omitted first production month. When we consider all wells, the treatment
25Coefficients for the time-invariant survival function are similar to the time-varying parameter survival
model. We also estimate a linear probability model in the appendix.
26We estimate a four-knot restricted cubic spline with knots at 1.1, 1.4, 2, and 2.4 months. Knots are
clustered early in the production lifetime since this is where the most curvature is in the production path.
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Table 1: Average effect of the regulation on flaring rates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dif Dif NN Match D-in-D D-in-D NN Match
Panel A: All Wells
Post-2015 (M1-M12) -0.112*** -0.043*** -0.072***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Post-2015 (M4-M12) -0.234*** -0.017 -0.089***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Log Gas Production 0.034*** 0.044***
(0.002) (0.002)
Log Dist. to Gathering Line 0.027***
(0.003)
∆ Log HH Price -0.447*** -0.185***
(0.063) (0.056)
∆ Log WTI Price -0.313*** -0.114**
(0.050) (0.048)
Observations 26,610 26,610 3,292 26,423 26,423 2,747
Wells 3,358 3,358 3,292 3,171 3,171 2,747
Panel B: Wells Connected by Second Production Month
Post-2015 (M1-M12) -0.034*** 0.003 0.030***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Post-2015 (M4-M12) -0.124*** -0.004 0.015
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
Log Gas Production 0.012*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.003)
Log Dist. to Gathering Line 0.012***
(0.003)
∆ Log WTI Price -0.272*** -0.136**
(0.054) (0.056)
∆ Log HH Price -0.235*** -0.133*
(0.065) (0.068)
Observations 15,527 15,527 1,980 15,414 15,414 1,631
Wells 1,980 1,980 1,980 1,867 1,867 1,631
Well FE No No No Yes Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No No No No
Township FE No Yes No No No No
Production Month FE No Yes No No Yes No
Calendar Month FE No Yes No No Yes No
Weather Controls No Yes No No Yes No
Notes: The dependent variable is the well-level flaring rate. The coefficients of interest are Post-2015 (M1-M12),
which equals 1 if the well was completed after 2015, and Post-2015 (M4-M12), which equals one if the well was
completed after 2015 and it is after the well’s fourth production month. Dif, D-in-D, and NN Match denote our
differences, difference-in-differences, and nearest neighbor matching estimators. Regression standard errors are
clustered at the well level, and NN match standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Figure 3: Treatment effects of the regulation on flaring rates by production month.
(a) All Wells (b) Connected Wells
Notes: Figure 3 graphs the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation (6).
Time is specified in production time, and the effects are relative to the regulation’s effect in the first
production month. Figure 3a includes all wells, and Figure 3b includes wells that were connected in the
first two production months. Both regressions include the same controls as in column (5) of Table 1.
Standard errors are clustered at the well level.
effects are concentrated between the third and seventh production months, where we find a
3%–4% reduction in flaring rates relative to control wells. As before, we find no impact of
the regulation on flaring at connected wells.
5.4 Results: Mechanisms
Figure 4 graphs the KM survival functions and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for
wells’ spud-to-completion and first production-to-connection times. Figure 4a graphs the
survival probabilities for each month since initial spudding. In all months, the survival
probability (non-completion probability) is higher for wells spudded after 2015 than those
spudded in 2014. Six months after spudding, only 42% of 2014 wells remained incomplete,
while over 55% of 2015–2016 wells remained incomplete. Figure 4b graphs survival proba-
bilities for the time-to-connection duration models. Wells completed after 2015 have lower
survival rates in all months. In the first production month, 45% of wells completed in 2014
remained unconnected while 35% of wells completed in 2015 were unconnected. We ob-
serve smaller differences in survival probabilities in the second and third production months.
However, in the fourth month when new wells become subject to the regulation, the survival
probability for wells completed after 2015 falls sharply, and the survival function remains
lower through the ninth production month.
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier survival estimates.
(a) Spud-to-Completion Time (b) First Production-to-Connection Time
Notes: Figure 4 graphs KM survival probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for wells completed in 2014
and after 2015. Figure 4a graphs KM survival probabilities for spud-to-completion time. Figure 4b graphs
KM survival probabilities for first production-to-connection time.
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimates from our structural survival models. Coefficients
from the survival model in columns (1) to (3) are specified in accelerated failure-time so that
a one unit change in explanatory variable xj increases the failure time by exp(βj). Columns
(4) and (5) present the regression-adjusted mean completion time for 2014 wells and the
difference in completion time (measured in months) between wells completed in 2014 and
those completed after 2015. Consistent with the KM estimates, wells spudded after 2015
have longer spud-to-completion times and quicker connection times than those completed in
2014. In our specification with the full set of controls, we find that wells completed after
2015 have over 20% longer completion times, taking around 1 month longer to be completed
on average. Conditional on producing, wells completed after 2015 have 12% shorter non-
connection times, and connect to gas capture infrastructure 0.7 months sooner than wells
completed in 2014, on average.
Table 4 presents our results for the effects of the regulation on firms’ oil and gas produc-
tion. We find no consistent differences in oil or gas production across specifications at wells
completed after 2015 compared to those completed in 2014. Thus, on average, we find no
evidence that firms curtail production in response to the regulation. This is consistent with
previous work – conditional on drilling a well it is optimal for firms to produce at maximum
capacity (Kellogg, 2011; Anderson et al., 2016).
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Table 2: Effect of the regulation on spud-to-completion duration.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFT AFT AFT ATE ATE
Completed Post-2015 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.206*** 1.215*** 1.101***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.094) (0.096)
Log Water Inputs 0.024** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.011)
Log Non-Water Inputs -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Log Well Depth 0.181** 0.246***
(0.089) (0.089)
∆ Log HH Price 0.431*** 0.512***
(0.099) (0.116)
∆ Log WTI Price 0.040 0.264***
(0.077) (0.094)
Log Distance to Pipeline -0.015** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006)
Mean Completion Time 6.281*** 6.299***
(2014 Wells) (0.056) (0.060)
Observations 22,844 21,895 21,605 3,185 3,182
Density Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull
Weather Control No No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the spud-to-completion duration. Columns (1)-(3) present
estimates from the parametric survival functions which are specified in accelerated failure
time (AFT). Columns (4) and (5) present estimated average treatment effects of the regula-
tion measured in months. Standard errors are clustered at the well level. *, **, *** denotes
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Table 3: Effect of the regulation on first production-to-connection duration.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFT AFT AFT ATE ATE
Completed Post-2015 -0.140*** -0.087*** -0.128*** -0.541*** -0.697***
(0.040) (0.032) (0.032) (0.077) (0.083)
Log Gas Production -0.249*** -0.249***
(0.011) (0.011)
∆ Log HH Price -0.688*** -0.037
(0.162) (0.198)
Log Distance to Pipeline 0.114*** 0.115***
(0.011) (0.011)
Mean Connection Time 2.321*** 2.405***
(2014 Wells) (0.065) (0.074)
Observations 6,523 6,523 6,503 3,131 3,128
Model AFT AFT AFT ATE ATE
Density Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull
Weather Control No No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is first production-to-connection duration. Columns (1)-(3)
present estimates from the parametric survival functions which are specified in accelerated failure
time (AFT). Columns (4) and (5) present estimated average treatment effects of the regulation
measured in months. Standard errors are clustered at the well level. *, **, *** denotes signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
20
Table 4: Average effect of the regulation on oil and gas production.
(4.A) Oil Production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dif Dif Dif NN Match
Post-2015 (M1-M12) -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 0.007
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032)
Log Initial Oil Production 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.288***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
∆ Log WTI Price -0.107 -0.005 -0.009
(0.093) (0.095) (0.095)
Observations 26,610 26,610 26,610 3,358
Wells 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358
Prod Time Controls ARPS Cubic Spline Prod FEs N/A
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No
Township FE Yes Yes Yes No
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes No
(4.B) Gas Production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dif Dif Dif NN Match
Post-2015 (M1-M12) 0.042 0.050* 0.050* 0.027
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.036)
Log Initial Gas Production (mcf/day) 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
∆ Log HH Price 0.117 0.179 0.182
(0.124) (0.126) (0.126)
Observations 26,140 26,140 26,140 3,292
Wells 3,292 3,292 3,292 3,292
Prod Time Controls ARPS Cubic Spline Prod FEs N/A
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No
Township FE Yes Yes Yes No
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: The coefficients of interest are Post-2015 (M1-M12), which equals 1 if the well was completed
after 2015. Dif and NN Match denote our differences and nearest neighbor matching estimators.
Standard errors are clustered at the well level, and standard errors in the NN match specifications
are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level.
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6 Heterogeneous Costs and Gains from Trade
In this section, we make use of our theoretical model and empirical results to construct
firm MAC curves. We use the estimated MAC curves to study the efficiency of the NDIC
regulation, and quantify potential gains from instituting more flexible flaring standards in
the state. We explore three counterfactual policies. The first allows for inter-firm trading
but continues to enforce the same flaring standard in every month. The second allows for
inter-temporal trading but leaves in place the firm-specific standard. The third combines
the two forms of trade.
6.1 Firm Abatement Costs
Section 3 showed that a firm connects a well if the cost of doing so is below some threshold.
We use this insight to study the efficiency of the NDIC flaring regulation. In a static setting
with continuous abatement cost functions, the regulation achieves a given aggregate flaring
reduction at minimum total cost if and only if marginal abatement costs are equalized across
firms.27 In our setting, firms have discrete connection decisions so equality across firms may
not hold. Thus, we require a slight modification to this rule. The regulation is cost-effective
if and only if all connected wells were connected at a lower cost per unit of gas captured
than wells left unconnected.
Other features of our setting complicate this static efficiency measure. First, we observe
empirically that firms ultimately connect most of their wells to gas capture infrastructure.
Second, abatement costs evolve – new wells begin producing oil and gas every month, and the
potential gas captured at a given well decreases every month that it is not connected. Last,
firms must comply with the regulation in every month. Given this, we limit our analysis
in a few important ways. First, we restrict our attention to the efficiency of the policy in
its first eighteen months. Second, we assume the ex-post observed flaring reductions over
this period are the desired levels envisioned by the NDIC. This allows us to calculate total
abatement over the first year-and-a-half of the program, construct counterfactual compliance
paths for firms that achieve the same aggregate abatement, and compare abatement costs
across scenarios.
We first must construct firm and industry MAC curves. For a given month, we construct
firm MAC curves by calculating the right-hand side of equation (2) for every well owned
by a firm that is not already connected to gas capture infrastructure in that month. The
27This condition need not hold in a dynamic setting. For example, a firm may connect a well that statically
has connection costs that are ‘too high’ because the firm is forward-looking and anticipates connecting more
wells to newly developed infrastructure in the future. We do not study forward-looking behavior here.
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calculation consists of two components: (i) the well connection costs; and (ii) the well’s
expected gas production. We calculate the latter using the ARPS model from Table 4. We
specify well i’s gas production git in any month t as:
log(git) = β1 log(t) + θi + εit (9)
where θi is a well fixed effect. The estimated decline rate is βˆ1 = −0.342. For new wells, we
assume firms know Gi0, the initial gas production from well i. Given Gi0 we can compute the
expected lifetime gas production gi for any well i. We use a twenty year lifetime to calculate
the total amount of gas that a well will produce.
Given gi we compute the right-hand side of equation (2), the per unit connection cost for
connecting the well, as:
(On-site Fixed Costs) + (Pipeline Costs)× di
gi
. (10)
The first term in the numerator is the fixed cost of on-site equipment.28 The second term
is the cost of constructing a gathering line to well i, which is a function of the length of the
line, di. We obtain on-site costs and per-mile estimates of gas gathering line costs from the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA). INGAA reports the average costs
for equipment at $210,000 per well. Data from Rextag indicate that the average gathering
line diameter is 4 inches, and INGAA reports that the cost per mile of 4-inch gathering
line is $155,000. To compute the length of the gathering line, we calculate the minimum
distance from a well to another gathering line or a natural gas pipeline using the data from
Rextag. Because we only observe a snapshot of the pipeline network, we do not capture how
gathering line distance may be changing over time. Since we consider our counterfactual
over an eighteen month horizon, a one time snapshot of the pipeline network is likely a
close approximation. Firms’ MAC curves still change from month to month – new wells
come online, wells are connected to gas capture infrastructure and excluded from future
MAC curves, and wells that are not connected in the previous month have higher per unit
connection costs as the well is depleted of gas.
After calculating equation (10) for every unconnected well in month t, we construct firm
MAC curves by ordering all wells owned by a firm by their costs. Figure 5a graphs an example
of five firms’ MAC curves for one month in our sample, November 2015. Hess, Whiting, and
XTO own many wells that have low connection costs and high gas production, while Triangle
and Slawson own fewer wells, the wells they own are typically less gas productive, and the
28This includes dehydrators, compressors, and other technologies that remove hazardous pollutants like
hydrogen sulfide.
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Figure 5: Firm marginal flaring abatement cost curves.
(a) Observed Connection Decisions (b) Efficient Connection Decisions
Notes: The left figure graphs MAC curves for five firms in November 2015 and their well connection
decisions in that month. The right figure graphs the connection decisions under the efficient industry
outcome. Orange circles indicate wells that are connected and orange X’s indicate wells that are left
unconnected.
wells have higher connection costs. Circles indicate the wells that the firms connected in that
month and X’s indicate wells that were left unconnected. Consistent with our theoretical
model, firms mostly connect their lowest cost wells and leave high-cost wells unconnected. It
is also clear from the Figure that the most productive wells, those with the largest horizontal
gaps, also tend to be low-cost wells. This is consistent with firms clustering drilling activity
in productive oil and gas regions with nearby gas capture infrastructure. The unproductive
wells’ high connection cost wells may be exploratory wells, and are typically far from existing
gas capture infrastructure.
Figure 5 highlights clear differences in MACs across the five firms. Figure 6a aggregates
all MAC curves. As before, connected wells are denoted by orange dots, and unconnected
wells are denoted by blue X’s. Industry-wide, many cheap wells were left unconnected while
several costly wells were connected to gas capture infrastructure. These findings motivate
our following dynamic counterfactuals.
6.2 Counterfactual Policy Simulations
We now use our estimated firm and industry MAC curves to compare three counterfactual
compliance scenarios and compare them to firms’ observed connection decisions and abate-
ment costs over the first eighteen months of the regulation. Here we describe our three
scenarios and discuss our findings. Section B in the appendix contains details on how we
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Figure 6: Industry marginal flaring abatement cost curves.
(a) Observed Industry MAC Curve (b) Efficient Industry MAC Curve
Notes: The left figure graphs the industry MAC curve in November 2015. The right figure graphs the
connection decisions under the efficient industry outcome. Orange circles indicate wells that are connected
and orange X’s indicate wells that are left unconnected.
compute the counterfactuals.
Our first counterfactual, inter-firm trading, considers the gains from allowing inter-firm
trading within a month but requires the counterfactual total industry abatement to equal
the observed total industry abatement every month. The exercise isolates potential gains
from inter-firm trade. The outcome would be achieved by instituting a cap-and-trade pro-
gram with a time-varying cap and no banking or borrowing, or a time-varying flaring tax.
Figures 5b and 6b illustrate this exercise graphically for one month – November 2015. In the
counterfactual, Triangle does not connect any of its wells, while all other firms connect just
a few wells to achieve the same flaring reduction. Figure 6b illustrates this in the aggregate.
Our second counterfactual, within-firm banking and borrowing allows greater flexibility
in the timing that firms connect wells, but re-institutes a ban on inter-firm trading and
requires each firms total counterfactual abatement to equal its observed total abatement.
This outcome can be achieved under a firm-specific cap-and-trade program with fully flexible
banking and borrowing, or a firm-specific tax on flaring.
Our final counterfactual, inter-firm trading with banking and borrowing combines the pre-
vious two and allows for both inter-firm and inter-temporal flexibility. This is equivalent to
an industry cap-and-trade program with unlimited banking and borrowing, or an industry
flaring tax.
Table 5 presents the absolute and relative cost savings from the three counterfactual
simulations. For reference, we estimate that from January 2015 through June 2016, the oil
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Table 5: Least-cost counterfactual simulation results.
Relative
Cost
Savings
Absolute
Cost Savings
(Million $)
Scenario 1: Inter-Firm Trading 16% $77
Scenario 2: Within-Firm Banking and Borrowing 10% $49
Scenario 3: Inter-Firm Trading with Banking and Borrowing 20% $96
and gas industry in North Dakota captured 3.3 billion mcf of gas at the cost of $478 million.
The first column shows that allowing inter-firm trading reduces compliance costs by 16%,
saving $77 million. The second column shows that allowing firms to bank and borrow reduces
costs by 10%, or $49 million. For this second counterfactual, the firm-specific taxes that
achieve the same counterfactual flaring reductions for every firm, varies between $0.15/mcf
and $9.47/mcf. This illustrates the large differences in compliance costs. For reference, this
amounts to a carbon tax between $9/tCO2 and $179/tCO2.
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The final column of Table 5 presents gains from moving to the most flexible regulation –
an industry tax on flared gas or an industry cap-and-trade program with full banking and
borrowing. This would reduce compliance costs by 20%, or $96 million, over the eighteen
month window. The calculated tax that would achieve this reduction is $0.42/mcf. For
reference, this amounts to a carbon tax of about $8/tCO2, well below current estimates of
the social cost of carbon. Alternatively, royalty rates for public land are 16.66% of gross
revenue. Using the average Henry Hub gas price over this period ($2.72/mcf), this amounts
to a $0.45/mcf tax. Thus, conditional on our cost estimates being accurate, this suggests that
the NDIC could achieve the same flaring reduction at considerably lower cost by requiring
oil and gas firms to pay public lands royalty rates on their flared gas.
We make several important simplifying assumptions for the counterfactual scenarios. For
example, we use a twenty year lifetime horizon for all wells, assume all wells build pipelines
that are the same diameter, assume the gathering line distance is the shortest distance to an
existing line, assume that right-of-way costs are minimal, use a uniform cost for wells’ on-site
infrastructure costs, and assume away any forward-looking behavior by firms. We test the
sensitivity of some of these choices in the appendix. In general, while the level of cost savings
differs when we vary, for example, well diameter, the relative cost savings remain roughly of
the same magnitude.
29We use the average carbon intensity of natural gas. Propane and butane have carbon intensities about
15% higher.
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7 Conclusions and Discussion
We use rich, well-level data on oil firms’ operations in North Dakota to study the effects
and efficiency of a new regulation aimed at reducing gas flaring in the state. Our results
suggest that the regulation has been effective. Well operators have reduced flaring rates 4
to 7 percentage points, and we attribute between one-third and one-half of the observed
year-on-year reduction in flaring at new wells to the regulation. The primary mechanism
that firms comply is by connecting wells to gas capture infrastructure more quickly than
they did historically.
While the regulation was effective at reducing flaring in the state, we also show that there
are substantive costs from misallocation of abatement caused by heterogeneous compliance
costs and the regulation being enforced uniformly across firms. Using a simple counterfactual
exercise based on estimated MAC curves, we show that reallocating abatement from high- to
low-cost firms would reduce aggregate compliance costs considerably. Moreover, using our
preferred estimates, a relatively modest flaring tax could achieve the same aggregate reduc-
tion in flaring at lower cost. The finding highlights a key feature of oil and gas production in
North Dakota that discourages flaring – firms pay royalty and taxes only on sold gas in the
first year of production. Using our preferred infrastructure cost estimates, the state could
have achieved the same reduction in state-wide flaring by simply charging firms royalties on
flared gases at the current public lands rate.
Our results are subject to important caveats. We rely on reduced-form methods to estimate
the average treatment effects of the regulation. The methods do not allow for strategic
decision-making by firms or take full advantage of the feature that connecting to gas capture
infrastructure requires large upfront costs and forward-looking behavior. Also, our results
are conditional on the existing state of gas capture infrastructure in North Dakota. Thus,
our results pertain only to the effects of the regulation on oil operators’ gathering line
installation decisions and do not allow for strategic investments in other gas capture and
processing infrastructure. Discussions with regulators in North Dakota confirm that among
the more salient changes since the passage of the regulation is more regular coordination
between oil operators and gas processing plants. Future work may consider the interactions
between these two groups, as well as examine the effects of the NDIC regulation on the
development and placement of gas pipelines and processing plants.
In addition, recent work studying the Texas oil and gas industry shows that a failure
to internalize environmental risks due to bankruptcy protections shifts industry structure
towards smaller firms (Boomhower, 2016). Small firms may also take advantage of the
benefits of limited liability in the North Dakota shale fields. The introduction of new,
27
stringent flaring standards may, therefore, act to increase capital costs for drilling new wells.
If these new, larger upfront costs affect firms’ entry decisions, the new standard may have
the effect of pricing smaller, capital constrained firms out of the market. Future research
may explore these issues along with a number of other effects of this and similar regulations.
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Appendix
Section A contains our summary statistics table, Section B describes our counterfactual
algorithms, Section C contains sensitivity analysis and robustness checks.
A Summary Statistics
Table A.1 presents summary statistics, disaggregated by the pre and post-regulation periods.
Production, fracking input use, and total well depth increased between the two periods. Gas
flaring rates in the first year of production fell from 34% in 2012–2014 to 22% in 2015–2016.
Flaring rates are lower at connected wells, but are non-zero and similar across wells completed
before and after the regulation.30 The decrease coincides with shorter gas connection times.
Oil and gas prices vary substantially over the sample. Average WTI and HH prices were
$94/bbl and $3.80/mcf in 2012-2014, respectively. Both have fallen considerably since the
summer of 2014, averaging just $46/bbl and $2.55/mcf in 2015–2016.
30Flaring at connected wells is typically the result of issues with or excess pressure in pipelines, or to
natural gas plants operating at or near capacity.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Std. Dev.
2012-2014
Oil Production in 1st Year (bbls/day) 297.89 222.77 280.28
Gas Production in 1st Year (mcf/day) 328.90 219.33 391.87
Water Products Injected (1000 gals) 3,093.36 2,479.55 2,320.94
Non-Water Products Injected (1000 gals) 3.44 0.00 22.79
Well Depth (ft) 20,081.55 20,496.00 1,615.49
Flaring in 1st Year: All Wells (%) 0.34 0.11 0.40
Flaring in 1st Year: Connected Wells (%) 0.21 0.05 0.30
Time to Gas Connection (Months) 3.51 2.00 4.93
Distance from Pipeline (miles ) N/A N/A N/A
WTI Price ($/bbl) 93.15 95.60 9.13
Henry Hub Price ($/mcf) 3.89 3.94 0.49
2015-2016
Oil Production in 1st Year (bbls/day) 377.80 297.10 318.36
Gas Production in 1st Year (mcf/day) 514.97 372.70 506.57
Water Products Injected (gals) 4,516.25 3,539.84 4,609.35
Non-Water Products Injected (gals) 866.73 0.00 11057.80
Well Depth (ft) 20,351.90 20,690.00 1,630.16
Flaring in 1st Year: All Wells (%) 0.22 0.06 0.31
Flaring in 1st Year: Connected Wells (%) 0.17 0.05 0.25
Time to Gas Connection (Months) 1.73 1.00 1.39
Distance from Pipeline (miles ) 0.38 0.12 0.89
WTI Price ($/bbl) 48.76 48.41 7.35
Henry Hub Price ($/mcf) 2.72 2.85 0.28
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B Counterfactual Algorithm Details
Here we describe the algorithm for computing our three different counterfactual scenarios:
inter-firm trading, within-firm banking and borrowing, and inter-firm trading with banking
and borrowing.
Inter-firm trading Our first counterfactual scenario considers the gains from allowing
inter-firm trading within a month/compliance period, but requires the same counterfactual
flaring abatement within every compliance period as the observed flaring abatement. This
exercise isolates potential gains from inter-firm trade.
We compute the counterfactual compliance scenario for every month starting from January
2015 to June 2016 as follows:
1. For every month, compute the observed total abatement (captured gas).
2. Starting in January 2016, order all wells by their MAC. Compute the least-cost con-
nection decisions to achieve the same flaring reduction observed in that month.
3. Carry forward all wells that were not connected in the counterfactual, recompute their
expected lifetime gas production, and add any new wells that begin producing in that
month to the counterfactual industry MAC curve. Compute the least-cost connection
decisions to achieve the same, monthly observed abatement.
4. Repeat step 3 through June 2016.
Within-firm banking and borrowing Our second counterfactual allows greater flexi-
bility in the timing that firms connect wells, but re-institutes a ban on inter-firm trading.
For this, we take advantage of the fact that, given a sufficiently long time horizon, a firm-
specific cap-and-trade program with fully flexible banking and borrowing is equivalent to a
firm-specific tax on flaring.
For each firm, we compute the following:
1. Compute the total volume of gas captured by firm j from January 2015 to June 2016.
2. Search for some constant t∗j such that when all unconnected wells owned by firm j
with MACs below t∗j are connected in the first month that their MAC is below t
∗
j , the
total amount of gas captured over the full horizon equals the observed amount of gas
captured by firm j.
This counterfactual induces individual firms to capture the same amount of gas as in reality
but allows flexibility in the timing of gas capture.
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Inter-firm trading with banking and borrowing Last, we allow for both inter-firm and
inter-temporal flexibility. As in the previous scenario, we take advantage of the equivalence
between a flaring tax t∗∗ and an industry cap-and-trade program with unlimited banking
and borrowing.
For the entire industry, we compute the following:
1. Compute the total volume of gas captured by all firms from January 2015 to June
2016.
2. Search for some constant t∗∗ such that when all unconnected wells with MACs below
t∗∗ are connected in the first month their MAC is below t∗∗, the total amount of gas
captured over the full horizon is equal to the observed amount of gas captured by the
industry.
The value t∗∗ can be interpreted as the permit price in the tradable permit system with
banking and borrowing or as an industry-wide flaring tax.
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C Sensitivity Analyses and Robustness Checks
Table C.1 tests the sensitivity of our flaring results from Table 1 to specifying alternative
control wells. We explore three alternative control well specifications: (i) wells completed
between January and August 2014; (ii) wells completed from 2013–2014; and (iii) wells
completed in 2013. The first and third, in particular, address concerns that wells drilled just
before the policy may have altered their flaring rates in anticipation of the flaring regulation.
Where the results differ from our main specification, the effects are generally larger. Figure
C.1 presents corresponding flexible difference-in-difference results using alternative control
wells.
Table C.2 provides further validation of our empirical design, performing placebo regres-
sions. We define the placebo treatment group in the top panel as those completed in 2014
and the control group as those completed in 2013. We again limit our focus to the first twelve
months of production at a well and drop 2014 data for wells completed in 2013. The bottom
panel presents similar placebo tests defining the treatment group as wells completed in 2013
and the control group as wells completed in 2012. We find significant reduction sin flaring in
the placebo treatments when we use the differences and nearest neighbor estimators. This
suggests that we may omit some relevant well characteristics in comparing flaring rates in
production time from year-to-year. We find no impact of the regulation in the difference-
in-difference estimators – passing the placebo test. This is further validated in the flexible
difference-in-difference placebo regressions, presented in Figure C.2. The 2014 placebo does
not result in any statistically significant estimates, and the 2013 placebo treatment results
in a few positive estimates. This suggests we are unlikely simply picking up on flaring rates
decreasing over calendar time differentially throughout a well’s lifecycle.
Table C.3 explores the sensitivity of our spud-to-completion time duration models. As in
the flaring regressions above, we test the sensitivity of our estimates to redefining the control
group in three ways. All estimates are similar to those in Table 2, or generally larger.
Table C.4 explores the sensitivity of our connection time duration models to using al-
ternative control groups. As with the flaring regressions, where differences arise, we find
larger treatment effects. Table C.5 contains estimates from regressions exploring the tim-
ing of firms’ gas capture connection decisions to test whether the regulation leads to firms
connecting to gas capture infrastructure in specific months. For this, we estimate linear
probability models testing whether firms completed after 2015 were more likely to connect
in the first production month, the first four production months, and the fourth production
month conditional on entering the fourth production month unconnected. The regressions
more directly test whether the regulation impacts the timing of firms’ connection decisions.
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Conditional on our controls, wells are 10%–12% more likely to connect in the first month of
production or the first four months of production, respectively. Conditional on not having
connected before month 4, wells completed in 2015 are over 50% more likely to connect a
well in the fourth production month when the well is included in the firm flaring rate. This
is consistent with the results in the KM estimates from Figure 4b.
Table C.6 and Table C.7 present similar sensitivity test results using alternative control
groups for the impacts of the policy on wells’ oil and gas production. The corresponding
results in the main text are in Table 4. Oil production results are largely similar. How-
ever, as the comparison group includes older wells, those completed in 2013, we find larger
impacts. Similar issues arise with gas production. This is likely due to older wells being
less appropriate controls for 2015 wells – technological advances in oil and gas drilling have
advanced rapidly over this period.
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Table C.1: Average effect of the regulation on flaring rates using alternative control wells.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dif Dif NN Match D-in-D D-in-D NN Match
Panel A: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2014, January to August
Post-2015 (M1-M12) -0.093*** -0.041*** -0.102***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Post-2015 (M4-M12) -0.234*** -0.018 -0.066***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 25,033 25,000 2,527 25,011 25,011 2,527
Wells 2,728 2,725 2,527 2,706 2,706 2,527
Panel B: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2013-2014
Post-2015 (M1-M12) -0.129*** -0.116*** -0.130***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
Post-2015 (M4-M12) -0.234*** -0.015* -0.121***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 47,177 47,132 4,934 46,990 46,990 4,389
Wells 5,072 5,068 4,934 4,885 4,885 4,389
Panel C: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2013
Post-2015 (M1-M12) -0.139*** -0.146*** -0.209***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010)
Post-2015 (M4-M12) -0.234*** -0.009 -0.138***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Observations 36,097 36,061 2,575 36,075 36,075 2,660
Wells 3,259 3,256 2,575 3,237 3,237 2,660
Well FE No No No Yes Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No No No No
Township FE No Yes No No No No
Production Month FE No Yes No No Yes No
Weather Controls No Yes No No Yes No
Notes: The dependent variable is the well-level flaring rate. The coefficients of interest are Post-2015
(M1-M12), which equals 1 if the well was completed after 2015, and Post-2015 (M4-M12), which equals
one if the well was completed after 2015 and it is after the well’s fourth production month. Dif, D-
in-D, and NN Match denote our differences, difference-in-differences, and nearest neighbor matching
estimators. Regression standard errors are clustered at the well level, and NN match standard errors are
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Panel C NN match was based on the two nearest neighbors instead of five because of limited numbers
of exactly matched wells on the number of production months observed.
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Table C.2: Average effect of placebo regulations on flaring rates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 2014 Placebo Wells
Post-2014 (M1-M12) -0.151*** -0.102*** -0.137***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.027)
Post-2014 (M4-M12) -0.228*** 0.009 -0.134***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.029)
Observations 33,600 33,600 1,936 33,477 33,477 1,936
Wells 3,616 3,616 1,936 3,493 3,493 1,936
Panel B: 2013 Placebo Wells
Post-2013 (M1-M12) -0.117*** -0.066*** -0.082***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.033)
Post-2013 (M4-M12) -0.226*** 0.028** -0.054
(0.007) (0.012) (0.036)
Observations 31,246 31,203 1,779 31,111 31,111 1,779
Wells 3,377 3,373 1,779 3,242 3,242 1,779
Model Dif Dif NN Match D-in-D D-in-D NN Match
Well FE No No No Yes Yes No
Firm FE No Yes No No No No
Township FE No Yes No No No No
Production Month FE No Yes No No Yes No
Calendar Month FE No Yes No No Yes No
Weather Controls No Yes No No Yes No
Notes: The dependent variable is the well-level flaring rate. The coefficients of interest are Post-2015
(M1-M12), which equals 1 if the well was completed after 2015, and Post-2015 (M4-M12), which
equals one if the well was completed after 2015 and it is after the well’s fourth production month.
Dif, D-in-D, and NN Match denote our differences, difference-in-differences, and nearest neighbor
matching estimators. Regression standard errors are clustered at the well level, and NN match
standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table C.3: Effect of the regulation on spud-to-completion duration using alternative
control wells.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFT AFT AFT ATE ATE
Panel A: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2014, January to August
Post-2015 0.209*** 0.203*** 0.183*** 1.351*** 1.225***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.101) (0.107)
Log Distance to Pipeline -0.020*** -0.023***
(0.007) (0.007)
Non-water Inputs -0.001 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Water Inputs 0.027** 0.028**
(0.012) (0.013)
Log Total Depth of Well 0.148 0.222**
(0.093) (0.095)
∆ Log HH Price 0.777*** 1.125***
(0.115) (0.142)
∆ Log WTI Price -0.585*** -0.520***
(0.091) (0.105)
Observations 18,758 18,009 17,719 2,593 2,590
Panel B: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2013-2014
Post-2015 0.242*** 0.233*** 0.281*** 1.489*** 1.420***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.089) (0.088)
Log Distance to Pipeline -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005)
Non-water Inputs -0.002 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Water Inputs 0.028*** 0.031***
(0.010) (0.011)
Log Total Depth of Well 0.211*** 0.270***
(0.080) (0.071)
∆ Log HH Price 0.207** -0.237**
(0.086) (0.104)
∆ Log WTI Price 0.060 0.111
(0.070) (0.084)
Observations 32,372 27,245 26,955 4,153 4,149
Panel C: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2013
Post-2015 0.294*** 0.289*** 0.384*** 2.074*** 1.974***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.103) (0.116)
Log Distance to Pipeline -0.038*** -0.036***
(0.007) (0.006)
Non-water Inputs 0.002 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006)
Water Inputs 0.053*** 0.051***
(0.013) (0.012)
Log Total Depth of Well 0.041 0.105
(0.073) (0.072)
∆ Log HH Price -0.528*** -1.079***
(0.101) (0.129)
∆ Log WTI Price -0.316*** -0.308***
(0.082) (0.101)
Observations 21,030 16,411 16,121 2,438 2,435
Density Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull
Weather Control No No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the spud-to-completion duration. Columns (1)-(3)
present estimates from the parametric survival functions which are specified in accelerated
failure time (AFT). Columns (4) and (5) present estimated average treatment effects of
the regulation measured in months. Standard errors are clustered at the well level. *,
**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table C.4: Effect of the regulation on first production-to-connection duration using
alternative control wells.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AFT AFT AFT ATE ATE
Panel A: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2014, January to August
Post-2015 -0.226*** -0.137*** -0.195*** -0.445*** -0.747***
(0.043) (0.035) (0.037) (0.079) (0.103)
Log Distance to Pipeline 0.125*** 0.125***
(0.012) (0.012)
Gas Production -0.254*** -0.256***
(0.012) (0.012)
∆ Log HH Price -0.932*** -0.112
(0.191) (0.225)
Observations 5,601 5,601 5,601 2,530 2,530
Panel B: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2013-2014
Post-2015 -0.408*** -0.299*** -0.296*** -0.701*** -0.859***
(0.035) (0.029) (0.030) (0.061) (0.066)
Log Distance to Pipeline 0.138*** 0.138***
(0.010) (0.010)
Gas Production -0.287*** -0.287***
(0.010) (0.010)
∆ Log HH Price 0.617*** 0.448***
(0.145) (0.173)
Observations 12,100 12,100 12,100 4,664 4,664
Panel C: Alternative Control Wells - Completed 2013
post15 -0.612*** -0.466*** -0.498*** -0.887*** -1.144***
(0.040) (0.035) (0.039) (0.073) (0.083)
Log Distance to Pipeline 0.148*** 0.145***
(0.012) (0.012)
Gas Production -0.289*** -0.288***
(0.013) (0.013)
∆ Log HH Price 0.185 0.131
(0.181) (0.213)
Observations 8,530 8,530 8,530 2,933 2,933
Density Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull
Weather Control No No Yes No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is first production-to-connection duration.
Columns (1)-(3) present estimates from the parametric survival functions
which are specified in accelerated failure time (AFT). Columns (4) and (5)
present estimated average treatment effects of the regulation measured in
months. Standard errors are clustered at the well level. *, **, *** denotes
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table C.5: Effect of the regulation on gas connection probability using a linear probability
model.
(1) (2) (3)
Connection Month Month 1 Months 1 to 4 Month 4
Post-2015 0.098*** 0.122*** 0.560***
(0.020) (0.014) (0.073)
Log Initial Gas Production 0.050*** 0.008* 0.038*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.021)
Log Dist. to Gathering Line -0.031*** -0.012*** -0.017
(0.007) (0.004) (0.020)
Log Dif. HH Price (Connection Month) 0.244 -0.404*** -3.446***
(0.181) (0.106) (0.766)
Log Dif. WTI Price (Connection Month) 0.120 -0.267*** -1.654**
(0.171) (0.092) (0.752)
Observations 3,243 3,243 400
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Township FE Yes Yes Yes
Calendar Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether a well connected to
gas capture infrastructure in the month(s) specified in the header. Standard errors are
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level.
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Table C.6: Average effect of the regulation on oil production using alternative control
wells.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dif Dif Dif NN Match
Panel A: Alt. Control Wells - Completed 2014, January to August
Post-2015 (M1-M12) -0.009 0.002 0.003 0.059*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034)
Log Initial Oil Production 0.278*** 0.279*** 0.279***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
∆ Log WTI Price -0.079 0.050 0.038
(0.097) (0.100) (0.100)
Observations 25,033 25,033 25,033 2,572
Wells 2,728 2,728 2,728 2,572
Panel B: Alt. Control Wells - Completed 2013-2014
Post-2015 (M1-M12) 0.034* 0.034* 0.036** 0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023)
Log Initial Oil Production 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.251***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
∆ Log WTI Price -0.147* -0.110
(0.079) (0.079)
Observations 47177 47177 47177 5072
Wells 5072 5072 5072 5072
Panel C: Alt. Control Wells - Completed 2013
Post-2015 (M1-M12) 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.038
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026)
Log Initial Oil Production 0.243*** 0.243*** 0.243***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
∆ Log WTI Price 0.065 0.094 0.084
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 36,097 36,097 36,097 2,665
Wells 3,259 3,259 3,259 2,665
Prod Time Controls ARPS Cubic Spline Prod FEs N/A
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No
Township FE Yes Yes Yes No
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: Standard errors in all regression equations are clustered at the well
level, and standard errors in the NN match specifications are robust to arbi-
trary heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level.
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Table C.7: Average effect of the regulation on gas production using alternative control
wells.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dif Dif Dif NN Match
Panel A: Alt. Control Wells - Completed 2014, January to August
Post-2015 (M1-M12) 0.055** 0.067** 0.067** 0.072*
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.039)
Log Initial Gas Production (mcf/day) 0.250*** 0.249*** 0.249***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
∆ Log HH Price 0.152 0.216 0.207
(0.131) (0.133) (0.133)
Observations 24,604 24,604 24,604 2,527
Wells 2,683 2,683 2,683 2,527
Panel B: Alt. Control Wells - Completed 2013-2014
Post-2015 (M1-M12) 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.087***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025)
Log Initial Gas Production (mcf/day) 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.235***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
∆ Log HH Price -0.194** -0.192** -0.190**
(0.095) (0.096) (0.096)
Observations 45,843 45,843 45,843 4,934
Wells 4,934 4,934 4,934 4,934
Panel C: Alt. Control Wells - Completed 2013
Post-2015 (M1-M12) 0.197*** 0.198*** 0.198*** 0.114***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028)
Log Initial Gas Production (mcf/day) 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.231***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
∆ Log HH Price 0.041 0.049 0.055
(0.121) (0.122) (0.122)
Observations 34,994 34,994 34,994 2,575
Wells 3,166 3,166 3,166 2,575
Prod Time Controls ARPS Cubic Spline Prod FEs N/A
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes No
Township FE Yes Yes Yes No
Weather Controls Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: Standard errors in all regression equations are clustered at the well level, and standard
errors in the NN match specifications are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. *, **, and
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
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Table C.8: Sensitivity analysis of counterfactual cost and production parameters.
10 Year Production Horizon
2 Inch Pipe 4 Inch Pipe 8 Inch Pipe
Half Fixed Cost 18%, 23%, $0.33/mcf 22%, 27%, $0.40/mcf 28%, 34%, $0.51/mcf
Base Fixed Cost ($210, 000) 14%, 19%, $0.59/mcf 17%, 22%, $0.64/mcf 21%, 26%, $0.74/mcf
Double Fixed Cost 11%, 17%, $1.11/mcf 13%, 18%, $1.14/mcf 16%, 21%, $1.25/mcf
20 Year Production Horizon
2 Inch Pipe 4 Inch Pipe 8 Inch Pipe
Half Fixed Cost 18%, 21%, $0.22/mcf 22%, 25%, $0.26/mcf 28%, 32%, $0.35/mcf
Base Fixed Cost ($210, 000) 14%, 17%, $0.39/mcf 16%, 20%, $0.42/mcf 21%, 24%, $0.50/mcf
Double Fixed Cost 11%, 15%, $0.72/mcf 12%, 16%, $0.75/mcf 15%, 19%, $0.82/mcf
Notes: The first entry in each cell is the cost reduction from the inter-firm trading coun-
terfactual scenario. The second entry in each cell is the cost reduction from the inter-firm
trading and banking and borrowing counterfactual scenario. The third entry in each cell is
the cost-effective flaring tax associated with the second entry. Divide by 0.053 tCO2/mcf to
convert into an equivalent carbon tax. Our base parameterization is a 20 year production
horizon, 4 inch pipe, and the base fixed cost.
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Figure C.1: Treatment effects of the regulation on flaring rates by production month using
alternative control wells.
(a) Alternative Control Wells - Completed
2014, January to August
(b) Alternative Control Wells - Completed
2013-2014
Notes: Figure C.1a graphs the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation (6)
using wells completed in January 2014 – August 2014 as the control group. Time is specified in production
time, with month 1 corresponding to the first production month, and the effects are relative to the
regulation’s effect in the first production month. Figure C.1b graphs the point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals from estimating equation (6) using wells completed in 2013 as the control group. Both
regressions include the same controls as in column 2 of Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the well
level.
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Figure C.2: Treatment effects of placebo regulations on flaring rates by production month.
(a) 2014 Placebo Wells - All Months (b) 2013 Placebo Wells - All Months
Notes: Figure C.2a graphs the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation (5)
using a placebo regulation that goes into effect in 2014 and a control group defined as wells completed in
2013. Time is specified in production time, with month 1 corresponding to the first production month, and
the effects are relative to the regulation’s effect in the first production month. Figure C.2b graphs the
point estimates and 95% confidence intervals from estimating equation (5) using a placebo regulation that
goes into effect in 2013 and a control group defined as wells completed in 2012. Both regressions include
the same controls as in column 2 of Table 1. Standard errors are clustered at the well level.
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